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The Characteristics and Position of the Economic Structures of Estonia and Korea among the OECD Countries Introduction
Prior research has shown that when it comes to time and regional variation, the behaviour of the various industries of the economy tends to be contingent upon each other.
1 The variance of their relative importance is linked regardless. This in turn allows us to pose the question of not only an overarching trend of structural change but also one of economic typology and to study the placement and movement of countries within the said typology. The topic of varying economic structure between countries was brought up by Wacziarg, Imbs (2000) and from a convergence viewpoint by Wacziarg (2001) specifically. Unfortunately, not many in-depth studies on the subject have been done to date. Studies on structural convergence include Höhenberger, Schmiedeberg (2008) and Melihovs, Kasjanovs (2011) . The latter have also attempted to find a structural typology among European countries by utilising cluster analyses. Paas et al. (2009) and have combined factor and cluster analyses to show that European countries may be divided into certain groups which can be characterised by specific traits:
* The service-based welfare states of Western and Northern Europe with a strong but small core of high value-added industries, * The countries of Southern Europe where in addition to manufacturing, tourism is in a prominent position. These countries have a small but high value social sector as well.
* The transition states of Eastern and Central Europe with a sizable but low valueadded manufacturing presence. Both the business and private services sectors in these countries are on the rise. In addition, these countries have remarkable returns on mediation activities.
Similar conclusions have been drawn by Janger et al. (2011: 17) , however, their typology is based on more than just the structure of the economy:
 Higher-income countries with a specialisation in knowledge-intensive sectors, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
 Higher-income countries with a specialisation in less knowledge-intensive sectors, including Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain.
 Lower-income countries with a trade specialisation in technologically-progressive sectors including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
 Lower-income countries with a specialisation in less knowledge-intensive sectors, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
The typology of the various economic structures may seem hidden at first glance and as such is also an intriguing subject outside of the European Union. The current article will look at the OECD countries while paying special attention to finding the posi- 
Sectoral Structure of Employment
Excluding the quarrying industry, for which no data was available, our component analysis reached a structure that could be described with three or four components (the corresponding eigenvalues were greater than one). It is remarkable that the first two components were not at all dependent on the specification of the following two, which speaks volumes about their robust and objective nature (Table 1 ). The density of correlations between first components found from two different models reached 0.99.
When interpreting the first two components (Table 1) we can see some overlapping with the components found with European Union data The above interpretation is also confirmed when looking at the allocation of the countries on the level of factor scores ( Figure 1 ). It is worth noting that Estonia is an outlier -it has the largest technology component. This also sets it apart from other transitional economies which without it form a cluster of six countries. One may say that Estonia is clearly the most technologically advanced out of them. On the other hand, Japan alongside Korea seems to be moving closer to the economic structure of the tourism-based countries of Southern Europe. Despite this, Korea and Japan still belong to the cluster of advanced western service-based economies, although with relatively extensive deindustrialisation (the score of the first factor is slightly negative). The largest contribution of the current study is the forming of a third (and fourth) component ( Figure 2 ). These components are described by a relatively modest public sector, especially in the public services and education sense. This void in employment is filled by construction and multiple private sector services. Broadly speaking, the last two components separate large and small public sectors regarding employment. In the three dimensional model the component analysis integrates the last two components of the four dimensional model. In this case, the countries where employment in education and public services is relatively low (Japan, Korea, Ireland and Spain) have the largest positive factor scores, with the largest outlier being Luxembourg. The latter can be explained by the opportunity of using the public infrastructure, especially education systems, of its larger neighbouring countries. In place of the public sector, these countries have a large proportion of employment in construction, housing, financial services and other social and personal services in the private sector. This affinity is shared by the smaller Anglo-American countries (Australia, Canada and New Zealand), as well as Switzerland and Iceland, with the only transition state being Estonia. Larger economies like the UK and the US may not be able to afford a small public sector. Countries inclined toward a large public sector include the state-centred France and Belgium and also a majority of the Northern countries. Examples from less wealthy countries also include Poland and Greece. All in all, this component can be referred to as the private economy component. On the contrary, Korea seems to be the most frugal when it comes to public administration employment including social protection. The scores of this component exceed one in Spain, Japan, Ireland and the Netherlands. Estonia is not far behind. The countries with the largest public administration employment are Belgium and Greece, which could be related to servicing their large national debts.
Finally, the factors are cross-checked among each other and various socio-economic indicators (Table 2) . As expected, financial well-being (GNI per capita) is mostly and essentially only connected to the first so-called tertiarisation components of both specifications (F14 and F13). The other components do not describe well-being. The components are, however, moderately related to a country's monetary "thickness" (the state's proportion in GDP) -the tertiarisation and technology components have a positive relation and the private sector components a negative.
Relationship between Employment Structure and Relative Productivity
The latent components of employment are also connected to the relative productivity -that is to say in relation to the country's average productivity -of the various industries to a noteworthy extent (Table 3 ). In addition to this, we can see that the correlation between the proportion of employment and relative productivity is inverse in a number of industries. For example, in service-based economies relative productivity is lower in the service sector than in their manufacturing-based counterparts. The opposite is true when looking at the manufacturing sector. It is worth noting that the comparatively higher productivity of the service sector in less wealthy manufacturingbased countries is rather widespread, encompassing industries that do not define the first component in employment structure. A similar inverse relation between employment and relative productivity repeats itself in the case of the other components as well. The second component differentiated between countries with a higher proportion of employment in technological industries (manufacturing, energy and water management, transport and communication) and tourism-based states with a higher proportion of employment in housing, catering, retail and other personal services. Table 3 shows that employment and relative productivity are inversely related to the second component. Housing and catering is an exception in that higher employment in the sector is not coupled with lower productivity. The same can be said about the manufacturing sector. No significant differences between countries can be seen in employment in the education sector but better funding has brought with it higher productivity within the sector in the tourism-based countries.
The third component is predominantly characterised by its inverse relation with employment and productivity. This is mainly seen in education, public administration and private services. An outstanding confluent relation can be seen with both productivity and employment and financial services. No palpable difference in productivity can be seen as far as countries with a small government having a significant percentage of people employed in construction, housing and catering go.
In summary, we have confirmed the conclusion reached through the deconstruction of Estonia and Korea's average productivity stating that a rise in a sector's employment brings about a dip in its productivity. We have confirmed the structural burden hypothesis. This relation is, however, not univocal. One can only assume the extent of the influence of international competition on open sectors of the economy. Globalisation forces the labour force in wealthier countries out of low value-added industries. This entails a higher proportion of employment in the service sector at a lower value-added because international competition has a lower effect.
This does not, of course, mean a lower level of absolute productivity.
Employment Structure of the Manufacturing Industry
The following will take a detailed look at the employment structure of the OECD countries using the aforementioned principal component method. We are interested in whether the latent components that define it (Table 4) Low-tech manufacturing is based on textile, forestry, partially metal and food industry as well as other industries. High-tech manufacturing includes the manufacture of various machines and gadgets as well as chemistry and a large portion of metalwork.
The role of the third component (G33) is to describe the paper, cellulose and printing industries first and foremost. These industries cannot be completely categorised un-der a certain technological level and are not influenced by the spatial variation of other subindustries (related to Finland, Sweden and Canada's specialisation). This interpretation is also seen when looking at the allocation of countries at the component level. We will only look at two dimensions simultaneously (Figure 4) .
Manufacturing-based states are clearly set apart from the other by both general employment and level of technology. Manufacturing states are the countries where the factor score of at least one component is positive. The level of technology is determined by which factor score is greater. All transition states as well as some Southern European countries have specialised in low-tech manufacturing. Estonia and Portugal are forefront performers (the score of the second component exceeds two). Most other transition states are also represented in high-tech manufacturing, performing around the average (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary). Italy is not far behind. Highly advanced high-tech countries are mainly represented by Germany and Korea, the latter of which we are very interested in. A similar industrial trend can also be seen in Finland, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan, although to a much lesser extent. In conclusion, it can be said that Estonia and Korea are polar opposites as far as the internal structure of industrial employment goes.
When looking at how the first two components of industrial employment are related to the third component of the general economy we can see that the only statistically significant relation is between the low-tech and the tertiarisation components. As expected, this relation is negative. It is somewhat unexpected that the tertiarisation component is also inversely related to the medium-tech and high-tech component.
This can be somewhat explained by the negative correlation between industrial employment and national income per capita. The low-tech industry stands at -0.70 and the medium-tech and high-tech industry at -0.35. One can assume that the main reason is the negative relation between employment and relative productivity. 2. The main trend of the evolution is explained by the tertiarisation component which expresses the outstanding growth of the service sector relative to the two first (primary and secondary) sectors. At the same, this is either accompanied or preceded by an important rise in relative productivity in manufacturing and a dip in the service sector (compared to the averages of the economy).
The strongest inverse relation between the proportion of employment and relative productivity and the first structural component can be seen in the real estate sector: 0.87 and -0.66 respectively. Korea's overall lead over Estonia in the tertiarisation process is not very large (the deviation of its factor score is below one) and Korea is still around the average. group, where a large portion of the workforce is employed in housing, catering and retail, akin to Mediterranean countries. Unfortunately, it must be repeated that a rise in employment entails a relatively lower level or productivity, especially in the technology sector. For instance, the second principal component's relation to employment and productivity in the energy sector is 0.68 and -0.61 respectively.
4. The present study could, for the first time, interpret the following components in a meaningful way. Both the third and fourth component had a strong relation with differences in the institutional sectoral structure. In essence, countries with large and small employment in the public sector could be differentiated.
Both Estonia and Korea, especially the latter, are countries with low employment in the public sector. Employment in public administration and social protection is especially minute in Korea. Countries such as these have a large portion of employment in private services and especially construction to make up for their smaller public sector. The opposite can be seen in countries like France, Belgium, the Nordic countries, Poland and Greece. A reference to structural barriers must be made, meaning that the component has an inverse relation to both employment and productivity. This can be seen mainly in public administration, at -0.65 and 0.36 respectively. This means that a public sector with low employment may not necessarily be low on funding.
5. An even clearer picture was seen in the structural typology of the manufacturing. Two principal components were found, which were based on a dominant technological level. The STAN database divides the various industries into low, medium and high-tech manufacturing and as such pre-aggregated data could be added into the component analysis. The factor score of medium and high-tech manufacturing in the first component turned out to be 0.94. The factor score of low-tech manufacturing in the second component reached 0.96.
The content of the components is confirmed by the loadings of the various industries. The first component encompasses primarily machinery and the chemistry and fuel industries, while the second includes the textile, clothing and leather industries as well as forestry and manufacturing n.e.c. The third component is characterised by strong loadings in the paper and printing industry.
6. Korea and Estonia can both be considered manufacturing states because the factor score of at least one component exceeds one. Unfortunately, the different manufacturing specialisation of the two countries is clear as well. Estonia as well as Portugal is one of the low-tech manufacturing countries, while Korea is one of the high-tech manufacturing countries alongside Germany. Both Estonia and Korea have a very low representation of the other's level of technology (the factor score is negative). The largest industrial countries seem to be the transition states of Central Europe where industries of both technological levels are strongly represented.
7. As expected, the relation between the tertiarisation and industrialisation components is negative. General tertiarisation means deindustrialisation in employment in both the low and medium to high-tech sectors, albeit with varying intensity (-0.79 and -0.37 respectively). The difference in association coefficients hints at an inverse relation with relative productivity. Employment in manufacturing converges toward industries with higher relative productivity in times of economic upswing.
